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Did Harvard Get It Right?
by Laurel Currie Oates*
For most law students, there is a moment when, in frustration or
exhaustion, they throw up their hands and scream, "There must be a
better way." While many of the cases in the casebooks are interesting,
learning the law one case at a time seems, at best, inefficient, and at
worst, just plain stupid.' Wouldn't it be much easier, and better, if law
schools used the same pedagogy that is used in many other disciplines:
reading assignments, lectures, and exams that test whether students
have learned the information set out in those textbooks and lectures?
When students question law school pedagogy, some law school
professors respond by pointing out that law schools have been using the
casebook method, and the form of Socratic questioning that typically
accompanies it, since the method was first introduced by Christopher
Columbus Langdell at Harvard in the 1870s. According to these
professors, the casebook method is the best method because the primary
goal of law schools is not to teach students the law but to teach them to
* Associate Professor and Director of Legal Writing, Seattle University School of Law.
Professor Oates completed all but her dissertation for a Ph.D. in Educational Psychology
at the University of Washington. I would like to thank Professor Anne Enquist for her
critiques of drafts and Sarah Lyson for her assistance with the research for this Article.
1. Karl Llewellyn expressed a similar sentiment when he stated, "[Mian could hardly
devise a more wasteful method of imparting information about subject matter than the
case-class." Karl N. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC.
211, 215 (1948) (emphasis omitted).
2. During his tenure as the Dean of Harvard Law School, Christopher Columbus
Langdell introduced a number of significant reforms, including requiring a bachelor's
degree for admission, the use of a graded and sequential curriculum, annual examinations
for continuation and graduation, an independent career track for professional faculty, the
transformation of the library from a textbook repository into a scholarly resource, and
maybe most importantly, the casebook method of teaching. Bruce A. Kimball, The Langdell
Problem: Historicizing the Century of Historiography, 1906-2000s, 22 LAW & HIST. REV.
277, 277 (2004).
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"think like lawyers."3 Are these professors right? Did Langdell and
Harvard get it right when they rejected more traditional pedagogies and
adopted the casebook method?
This Article explores these questions in a different way than they are
typically approached.4  First, this Article is different from other
critiques of legal education because the primary source of information is
not law school professors but educational psychologists, in particular,
educational psychologists who study learning and transfer.5 Second,
this Article is different because it is written in a way that illustrates one
of the techniques that recent research indicates is likely to improve
transfer. Part I requires the reader to do what has been labeled as "data
analysis." Having done this data analysis, the reader moves to Part II
of the Article, a "lecture" that summarizes the research on transfer.
Part III presents a new task, a task in which the reader is asked to
transfer what he or she learned in Part I and Part II to a new situation.
Finally, Part IV describes and evaluates four different methods for
teaching law.
I. PART I: "DATA ANALYSIS"
Presume for a moment that you are a psychology professor who has
been asked to design a unit that will teach undergraduates about the
various theories relating to memory and the memory performances that
3. David P. Bryden, What Do Law Students Learn? A Pilot Study, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC.
479, 479 (1984); accord, e.g., Ruta K. Stropus, Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate
of Traditional Law School Methodology in the 21st Century, 27 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 449, 465-
67 (1996); David D. Garner, Comment, The Continuing Vitality of the Case Method in the
Twenty-First Century, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 307, 323-25 (2000). See also WILLIAM M.
SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007),
which defines the ability to think like a lawyer as "the ability to translate messy situations
into the clarity and precision of legal procedure and doctrine and then to take strategic
action through legal argument in order to advance a client's cause before a court or in
negotiation." Id. at 54.
4. For an annotated bibliography, see Arturo L6pez Torres & Mary Kay Lundwall,
Moving Beyond Landgell II: An Annotated Bibliography of Current Methods for Law
Teaching, 35 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 9-10, 43 (2000); see also Arturo L6pez Torres, MacCrate Goes
to Law School:An Annotated Bibliography of Methods for Teaching Lawyering Skills in the
Classroom, 77 NEB. L. REV. 132 passim (1998).
5. There are, of course, other articles that have applied educational research to legal
education. See, e.g., Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive
Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313 (1995); M. H. Sam Jacobson,
Learning Styles and Lawyering: Using Learning Theory to Organize Thinking and Writing,
2 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 27 (2004); Paula Lustbader, Construction Sites,
Building Types, and Bridging Gaps: A Cognitive Theory of the Learning Progression of Law
Students, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 315 (1997).
[Vol. 59676
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they predict. Spend five, ten, or even fifteen minutes listing the pros
and cons of each of the following teaching methods.
A. Option 1: Summarize + Lecture
Have students read a textbook chapter that describes several classical
research studies using both textual explanations and graphs, and then
have them write a one- to two-page paper summarizing what they have
just read. Use class time to provide students with a lecture that
explains the experiments, the results, and the theories that were
designed to accommodate the results.
B. Option 2: Data Analysis + Lecture
Have students read two or three research studies. Use the first class
to have students look for interesting patterns and the second class to
provide students with a lecture that explains the experiments, the
results, and the theories that were designed to accommodate the results.
C. Option 3: Data Analysis + Review of Data Analysis
Have students read two or three research studies. Use the first class
to have students look for interesting patterns. During the second class,
have students look at the studies one more time, looking for patterns
that they may have missed the first time.
II. PART II: THE "LECTURE"
In the early days of Saturday Night Live, Father Guido Sarducci
proposed a new type of university: The Five-Minute University.
6
Because most students forget most of what they are taught, the Five-
Minute University would teach only those things that the typical student
remembers. For example, if five years after taking a Spanish class, the
typical student remembers only two phrases, "ZC6mo estd usted?" and
"Muy bien," professors at the Five-Minute University would teach only
those two phrases. Similarly, if five years after graduation the only
thing that most students remember from their economics course is the
phrase "supply and demand," the Five-Minute University would teach
only that phrase.7
6. GILDA LIVE (Warner Bros. 1980). A clip of Donald A. Novello's performance as
Father Sarducci is available at http://www.cs.washington.edu/info/videos/asx/5minuteU.asx
(last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
7. Id.
20081 677
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Not surprisingly, Father Guido Sarducci's routine struck a chord with
many Saturday Night Live viewers.' Based on experience, viewers
knew that they remembered only a small percentage of what they were
taught in school.' Even more troubling, however, were studies that
showed that even when individuals remembered what they had been
taught, few were able to use that information at work or in their daily
lives.' °
A. Classical Transfer
Historically, transfer has been defined as "the degree to which a
behavior will be repeated in a new situation."" In addition, historically,
studies of transfer involved isomorphic problems in well-structured
domains.1
In one of the earliest studies of learning and transfer, Thorndike and
Woodworth asked their subjects to estimate the area of a rectangle. 3
After this pretest, each subject was given the opportunity to develop his
or her ability to estimate the area of a rectangle through practice and
8. See Daniel L. Schwartz, John D. Bransford & David Sears, Efficiency and
Innovation in Transfer, in TRANSFER OF LEARNING FROM A MODERN MULTIDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVE 1, 14 (Jose P. Mestre ed., 2005) [hereinafter Schwartz, Bransford & Sears,
Efficiency and Innovation in Transfer].
9. See id.
10. See, e.g., JEAN LAVE, COGNITION IN PRACTICE: MIND, MATHEMATICS AND CULTURE
IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1988), cited in Schwartz, Bransford & Sears, supra note 8, at 4; Jo
Boaler, Open and Closed Mathematics: Student Experiences and Understandings, 29 J. RES.
FOR MATHEMATICS EDUC. 41, 41 (1998); Alan H. Schoenfeld, When Good Teaching Leads
to Bad Results: The Disasters of "Well-Taught" Mathematics Courses, 23 EDUC.
PSYCHOLOGIST 145, 150 (1988).
11. Douglas K. Detterman, The Case for the Prosecution: Transfer as an Epiphenome-
non, in TRANSFER ON TRIAL: INTELLIGENCE, COGNITION, AND INSTRUCTION 1, 4 (Douglas K.
Detterman & Robert J. Sternberg eds., 1993). Other individuals have defined transfer as
"the ability to extend what has been learned in one context to new contexts." NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, How PEOPLE LEARN: BRAIN, MIND, EXPERIENCE, AND SCHOOL 51
(John D. Bransford, Ann L. Brown & Rodney R. Cocking eds., expanded ed. 2000) (citing
JAMES P. BYRNES, COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND LEARNING IN INSTRUCTIONAL CONTEXTS
74 (1996)).
12. Well-structured problems are problems that require the application of a limited
number of rules and principles within well-defined parameters. See, e.g., Norman
Frederiksen, Implications of Cognitive Theory for Instruction in Problem Solving, 54 REV.
EDUC. RES. 363, 363 (1986).
13. E. L. Thorndike & R. S. Woodworth, The Influence of Improvement in One Mental
Function Upon the Efficiency of Other Functions, 8 PSYCHOL. REV. 247, 252 (1901),
discussed in John D. Bransford & Daniel L. Schwartz, Rethinking Transfer: A Simple
Proposal with Multiple Implications, 24 REV. RES. EDUC. 61, 67 (1999) [hereinafter
Bransford & Schwartz, Rethinking Transfer].
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feedback.14 Although most subjects became relatively good at this task,
most of them did poorly on the posttest, which was the task of estimat-
ing the area of a circle.15 Because few of the subjects transferred what
they had learned about estimating the area of a rectangle to the task of
estimating the area of a circle, Thorndike and Woodworth concluded
"that the 'ability to estimate area' was not a general skill.""6
The classic study is, however, Gick and Holyoak's study.7 In this
study, Gick and Holyoak read the following story to their subjects:
A small country fell under the iron rule of a dictator. The dictator
ruled the country from a strong fortress. The fortress was situated in
the middle of the country, surrounded by farms and villages. Many
roads radiated outward from the fortress like spokes on a wheel. A
great general arose who raised a large army at the border and vowed
to capture the fortress and free the country of the dictator. The
general knew that if his entire army could attack the fortress at once
it could be captured. His troops were poised at the head of one of the
roads leading to the fortress, ready to attack. However, a spy brought
the general a disturbing report. The ruthless dictator had planted
mines on each of the roads. The mines were set so that small bodies
of men could pass over them safely, since the dictator needed to be able
to move troops and workers to and from the fortress. However, any
large force would detonate the mines. Not only would this blow up the
road and render it impassable, but the dictator would then destroy
many villages in retaliation. A full-scale direct attack on the fortress
therefore appeared impossible.
The general, however, was undaunted. He divided his army up into
small groups and dispatched each group to the head of a different road.
When all was ready he gave the signal, and each group charged down
a different road. All of the small groups passed safely over the mines,
and the army then attacked the fortress in full strength. In this way,
the general was able to capture the fortress and overthrow the
dictator.18
Gick and Holyoak then presented their subjects with Duncker's
"radiation problem." 9
14. Id.
15. Id. at 253.
16. Bransford & Schwartz, Rethinking Transfer, supra note 13, at 67.
17. See Mary L. Gick & Keith J. Holyoak, Analogical Problem Solving, 12 COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 306 (1980).
18. Id. at 351.
19. Id. at 307; Karl Duncker, On Problem Solving, 58 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 1, 2-17
(1945).
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Suppose you are a doctor faced with a patient who has a malignant
tumor in his stomach. It is impossible to operate on the patient, but
unless the tumor is destroyed the patient will die. There is a kind of
ray that can be used to destroy the tumor. If the rays reach the tumor
all at once at a sufficiently high intensity, the tumor will be destroyed.
Unfortunately, at this intensity the healthy tissue that the rays pass
through on the way to the tumor will also be destroyed. At lower
intensities the rays are harmless to healthy tissue, but they will not
affect the tumor either. What type of procedure might be used to
destroy the tumor with the rays, and at the same time avoid destroying
the healthy tissue? °
Those familiar with the two problems can see the parallels. First, in
both problems there is an object that must be destroyed. Second, in both
problems a direct attack will not work. Finally, in both problems you
can destroy the object by using divergence and convergence. Despite
these parallels, few of Gick and Holyoak's subjects saw the connections
between the two problems. 1 For example, after reading the fortress
story, only twenty percent of the subjects used the division and
convergence solution to solve the tumor problem.22 Other studies have
presented subjects with similar problems and have had similar results.
For instance, Reed, Ernst, and Banerji found that most individuals who
had learned to solve a "Missionary-Cannibal" problem did not apply that
solution to a "Jealous Husbands" problem, which was identical to the
Missionary-Cannibal problem except for the characters involved.23
Based on studies like those described above, researchers identified four
steps involved in transfer: problem representation, search and retrieval,
mapping, and application.'
1. Problem Representation. Most problems can be represented in
a number of different ways. For example, they can be represented in
terms of their surface features, that is, the specific facts of the problem;
they can be represented in terms of their underlying structures, that is,
20. Gick & Holyoak, supra note 17, at 307-08.
21. Id. at 325.
22. Id.
23. Stephen K Reed, George W. Ernst & Ranan Banerji, The Role of Analogy in
Transfer Between Similar Problem States, 6 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 436, 437-38, 441 (1974)
(discussing a problem regarding how to safely cross a river in a limited-capacity boat).
24. Zhe Chen, Schema Induction in Children's Analogical Problem Solving, 91 J. EDUC.
PSYCHOL. 703, 704 (1999); see also Laura R. Novick, Analogical Transfer, Problem
Similarity, and Expertise, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, &
COGNITION 510, 511 (1988).
680 [Vol. 59
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those abstract features or principles that are relevant to the solution;25
and they can be represented in terms of the procedures required to solve
the problem.2" Research has shown that the way in which an individu-
al represents a problem depends on his or her level of expertise.27
While novices will represent the problem in terms of its surface features,
experts will represent it in terms of its surface features, its underlying
structure, and the procedures required to solve the problem. 2' For
example, a novice would represent the fortress problem in terms of its
specific facts: a fortress, a general who wanted to attack the fortress,
and mines on the roads leading to the fortress. In contrast, the expert
would represent the problem not only in terms of its specific facts but
also in terms of the more general structure of the problem. That is, the
expert would represent it (1) as a problem involving an object that must
be destroyed but that cannot be directly attacked and (2) as a problem
that can be solved using a division and convergence problem solution.
2. Search and Retrieval. Once individuals have represented the
problem, they begin searching their memories for an analogous problem
that they can use to solve the current problem. Three factors seem to
affect this process.
The first factor is the individual's level of expertise.29  Because
novices represent problems in terms of their surface features, or facts,
novices will search their memories and look only for problems that
involve similar fact patterns. 30 For example, when given the radiation
problem, novices search their memories for prior problems involving
tumors. In contrast, experts will search their memories not only for
prior problems with similar facts but also for problems that have the
same underlying structure.3  Thus, experts would search their
memories both for problems involving tumors and for problems involving
objects that must be destroyed but that cannot be directly attacked. The
25. Novick, supra note 24, at 511.
26. Zhe Chen, Analogical Transfer: From Schematic Pictures to Problem Solving, 23
MEMORY & COGNITION 255, 257 (1995).
27. Novick, supra note 24, at 511; see also Brian H. Ross, Distinguishing Types of
Superficial Similarities: Different Effects on the Access and Use of Earlier Problems, 15 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION 456, 456 (1989).
28. Novick, supra note 24, at 511.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
6812008]
HeinOnline  -- 59 Mercer L. Rev. 681 2006-2008
MERCER LAW REVIEW
result is that while the novices would not find an analogous problem, the
experts might.32
The second factor that affects the search and retrieval process is the
level of abstraction at which the individual represents the problem's
surface and underlying structural features.33 Sander and Richard have
hypothesized that individuals look first for an analogy that shares, at a
concrete level, the same surface and structural features as the problem
that they have been asked to solve.34 For example, in learning how to
use a text editor (word processor), individuals will look first to the
"domain" of typing.35 If this first analogy is not sufficient to help them
solve the problem, they will then look to a more abstract domain.36 For
instance, if they cannot learn to use a text editor by referring back to
their knowledge about typing, individuals will look to the general
domain of writing.37 If they are still not able to solve the problem,
many individuals will look to the even more general domain of object
manipulation.3"
The third factor that appears to affect the search and retrieval process
is the way in which individuals store what they learn.3" A number of
researchers have suggested that knowledge is typically embedded in the
context in which the knowledge was originally acquired.4 ° For example,
when individuals learn a particular concept in a math class, that concept
is stored with other information that they have learned in previous math
classes. This storage system works well when a new problem is
encountered in the same context as the old problem. Thus, when
individuals encounter a new problem in math class, they will search
32. The finding that novices typically search for problems with similar surface features
is illustrated in legal writing by the observation that, in researching a problem, most first-
year students look for cases that have the same facts as the facts in their problem. For
example, when asked to research a problem involving the search of a locked glove
compartment, some students look only for cases involving the search of a locked glove
compartment. Unless they are prompted, they do not look for cases involving other types
of locked containers.
33. Novick, supra note 24, at 511.
34. Emmanuel Sander & Jean-Frangois Richard, Analogical Transfer as Guided by an
Abstraction Process: The Case of Learning by Doing in Text Editing, 23 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL.: LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION 1459 (1997).
35. Id. at 1462.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Miriam Bassok & Keith J. Holyoak, Interdomain Transfer Between Isomorphic
Topics in Algebra and Physics, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING MEMORY &
COGNITION 153, 153 (1989).
40. Id.
682 [Vol. 59
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their memories for similar problems encountered in other math
classes.4' The system does not work, though, when the new problem is
encountered in a different context. For example, if the individual
encounters the new problem at work, he or she will search for similar
problems encountered at work and not for prior problems encountered
in math classes. As a result, it is unlikely that the individual will be
able to retrieve the prior problem.42
3. Mapping. If the individual is successful in finding a prior
problem, he or she then compares the prior problem with the new
problem.43 This part of the process can fail for either of two reasons.
First, the individual may compare only the surface features of the two
problems and not the underlying structures, a process that can lead an
individual to incorrectly conclude that the two problems are similar
when in fact they are not.44 For example, in working on a memo or
brief, first-year law students may decide that a case that they have
located is analogous to their case because the facts of the two cases are
similar. However, even if both cases concern, for instance, one individu-
al striking another individual with a baseball bat, one case may be a
criminal case and the other a civil case. Moreover, even if the causes of
action are the same, the issues might be different. In one case, the court
may be deciding whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to
suppress evidence, and in the other it may be deciding whether the trial
court's instructions were proper. Second, the individual may compare
only the underlying structures.45 For instance, in comparing math
problems, students may recognize that both problems require the use of
the same equation, but they may not be able to determine which
variable goes in which slot.4" Even though the first problem is by far
the more common of the two problems, for transfer to occur, the
individual must be able to map correctly both the surface features and
the underlying structures.47
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See Sander & Richard, supra note 34, at 1461.
44. Ross, supra note 27, at 457-58.
45. Laura R. Novick & Keith J. Holyoak, Mathematical Problem Solving by Analogy,
17 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING MEMORY & COGNITION 398, 410-11 (1991).
46. Bassok & Holyoak, supra note 39, at 159.
47. Chen, supra note 26, at 256.
2008] 683
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4. Application. The final step in the process is the application of
the solution from the first problem to the second problem.45 Although
this part of the process is usually relatively easy, it sometimes fails
because the individual does not know the procedure for solving the first
problem and cannot, therefore, transfer that solution to solve the second
problem.49 In addition, it sometimes fails because the individual does
not make the necessary adaptations."°
However, even when researchers and educators have tried to use these
four factors to enhance transfer, the results have not been promising.5
As Detterman points out in his often-cited book, Transfer on Trial, "most
studies fail to find transfer," and "those studies claiming transfer can
only be said to have found transfer by the most generous of criteria."
5 2
Detterman continues,
In all of the studies I am familiar with that claim transfer, transfer is
produced by 'tricks' of one kind or another. These 'tricks' most often
involve just telling the subject to transfer by using hints or outright
suggestions. In more subtle cases, the 'trick' includes manipulations
that call the subjects [sic] attention, in obvious ways, to what the
experimenter expects on the transfer problem. In short, from studies
that claim to show transfer and that don't show transfer, there is no
evidence to contradict Thorndike's general conclusions: Transfer is
rare, and its likelihood of occurrence is directly related to the similarity
between two situations.
53
As a result, Detterman rejects the doctrines of formal discipline and
transfer.54 Instead, he argues that "if you want people to learn
something, teach it to them."'
In summary, there is almost no evidence to support the educational
philosophy of formal discipline or any of its variants. There is no good
evidence that people produce significant amounts of transfer or that
they can be taught to do so. There is, on the other hand, substantial
evidence and an emerging Zeitgeist that favors the idea that what
people learn are specific examples. Experts are experts because they
have learned many more examples than novices. When the expert is
48. Chen, supra note 24, at 704.
49. Chen, supra note 26, at 256.
50. Id.
51. Detterman, supra note 11, at 15.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 21.
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studied, the behavior may look mystical and appear to be unexplain-
able without invoking complex concepts like transfer. However,
current evidence suggests all that is necessary to be an expert is time,
basic ability, and the opportunity to learn a large body of exemplars by
experience.5"
Thus, as a new teacher, Detterman believed that the discovery of
principles was a fundamental skill that students needed to learn and
transfer to new situations. However, later in his career he viewed
education, including graduate education, as the learning of information.
Thus, instead of having students discover a principle, he would provide
it to them, presumably through reading assignments and lectures, and
then by illustrating the principle through the use of examples.5 7
According to Detterman, "[Y]ou should teach people exactly what you
want them to learn in a situation as close as possible to the one in which
the learning will be applied."
58
B. A Broader View of Transfer
Not all researchers are as pessimistic as Detterman. Those research-
ers who view learning not in behaviorist terms but as a process of
constructing new knowledge argue for a broader definition of transfer
and for the use of different measurement tools.59 For instance,
Schwartz, Bransford, and Sears distinguish between learning and
transfer that concerns the "direct application" of information or a skill
learned in one environment to a new environment and learning and
transfer that prepares students for future learning.6 ° In addition,
Schwartz, Bransford, and Sears distinguish between studies that require
subjects to transfer what has been learned in one environment to what
they call a "sequestered problem-solving" environment-an environment
in which subjects "have no access to 'contaminating' information sources
other than what they have learned previously, and where they receive
no chances to learn by trying out an idea and revising as necessary"-
56. Id. at 17.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Schwartz, Bransford & Sears, Efficiency and Innovation in Transfer, supra
note 8, at 4-6; see also Bransford & Schwartz, Rethinking Transfer, supra note 13, at 66;
Erik De Corte, Transfer as the Productive Use of Acquired Knowledge, Skills, and
Motivations, 12 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 142, 143 (2003).
60. Schwartz, Bransford & Sears, Efficiency and Innovation in Transfer, supra note 8,
at 5.
2008] 685
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and studies that look at how prior learning prepares students for future
learning.
61
In making these distinctions, Schwartz, Bransford, and Sears adopt
Broudy's three types of "knowing": replicative knowing, applicative
knowing, and interpretive knowing.62 According to Broudy, replicative
knowing regards remembering facts, and applicative knowing concerns
applying previously acquired knowledge to solve new problems. In
contrast, interpretive knowing refers to an individual's prior experiences
and learning, which determine what the individual notices about new
situations and how he or she frames the problem, which in turn affects
thinking and cognitive processes.' According to Broudy, people "know
with" knowledge even if they cannot remember specific facts ("knowing
that") or how to carry out a particular set of actions ("knowing how").65
Schwartz, Bransford, and Sears also distinguish between "transferring
in" and "transferring out."66  While transferring out occurs after a
particular type of learning experience, transferring in refers to the prior
interpretive knowledge that a person brings to a learning experience. 7
In exploring their broader definition of transfer, Schwartz, Bransford,
and Sears examined the following proposition often advanced by
teachers: that students learn better and are more likely to transfer what
they have learned when they are given the opportunity to actively
explore situations through the use of discovery learning, hands-on
learning, or experiential learning.'
Thus, in their 1998 study, Schwartz and Bransford looked at the task
that was set out at the beginning of this Article: determining the best
way to teach undergraduates about the various theories relating to
memory and the memory performances that they predict.
6 9
61. Id.; see also De Corte, supra note 59, at 143, 145.
62. Schwartz, Bransford & Sears, Efficiency and Innovation in Transfer, supra note 8,
at 8-11 (discussing H. S. Broudy, Types of Knowledge and Purposes of Education, in
SCHOOLING AND THE ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE 1, 1-17 (Richard C. Anderson, Rand J.
Spiro & William E. Montague eds., 1977)).
63. Id. at 9.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 9-10.
66. Id. at 11-12.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 16-17.
69. Id. at 17-20; see also Daniel L. Schwartz & John D. Bransford, A Time for Telling,
16 COGNITION AND INSTRUCTION 475, 475-76 (1998) [hereinafter Schwartz & Bransford, A
Time for Telling].
686 [Vol. 59
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Students in the first group, the Summarize + Lecture group, read a
textbook chapter that described several classic studies using both textual
explanations and graphs, and then wrote a one- to two-page summary
of the material that they had just read.7 ° In contrast, students in the
second group, the Data Analysis + Lecture Group, were asked to analyze
and graph data sets from classic memory experiments to find the
"interesting" patterns.7 ' Several days later, students in both groups
listened to a lecture that explained the experiments, the results, and the
theories that were designed to accommodate the results.7 2 Students in
the third group, the Data Analysis + Review of Data Analysis Group, did
the same data analysis activity as the students in the second group, but
instead of listening to the lecture, they analyzed the data a second time
looking for patterns that they might have missed the first time.7"
A week later, students in all three groups were asked to do two
tasks.7 ' The first task required students to recall factual assertions
from the lecture. For example, students were asked the following
question: "When people understand something they have read, they tend
to remember it verbatim. True or false?""6  In the second task,
students were asked to read about a new, and novel, experiment and to
predict as many outcomes from the experiment as possible.76
On the first task, which tested recall or memory, the students in the
first two groups, the Summarize + Lecture Group and the Data Analysis
+ Lecture Group, performed at a similar level while the students in the
third group, the Data Analysis + Review of Data Analysis Group, did
substantially worse.77 In contrast, on the second task, which tested the
students' ability to read about a new, and novel, experiment and to make
predictions, the students in the second group, the Data Analysis +
Lecture Group, did substantially better than the students in the other
two groups." See the following chart, which is reprinted from Efficien-
cy and Innovation in Transfer with the permission of the authors. 9
70. Schwartz, Bransford & Sears, Efficiency and Innovation in Transfer, supra note 8,
at 18.
71. Id. at 17.
72. Id. at 18.
73. Id. at 18-19.
74. Id. at 19.
75. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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In analyzing the results, Schwartz, Bransford, and Sears concluded
that giving individuals the time to explore contrasting cases can be an
effective way of preparing individuals to learn and that lectures can be
an effective method of instruction if the individuals listening to the
lecture are prepared to understand the significance of what the lecture
has to offer.80 In addition, Schwartz and Bransford emphasized the
importance of using different measures of learning and transfer, and
asserted that recall measure will, more likely than not, produce different
results than measures of transfer that look at preparation for future
learning."'
Relying on this study and other more complicated studies, 2 Sch-
wartz, Bransford, and Sears argue that activities that appear inefficient
for direct problem solving (applicative knowing) can still shape an
individual's interpretive knowing and yield measurable benefits for
learning.
8 3
80. Id. at 20.
81. Bransford & Schwartz, Rethinking Transfer, supra note 13, at 93-94.
82. See, e.g., Daniel L. Schwartz & Taylor Martin, Inventing to Prepare for Future
Learning: The Hidden Efficiency of Encouraging Original Student Production in Statistics
Instruction, 22 COGNITION & INSTRUCTION 129 (2004).
83. Schwartz & Bransford, A Time for Telling, supra note 69, at 511. The study is also
described in Schwartz, Bransford & Sears, Efficiency and Innovation in Transfer, supra
note 8, at 17.
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This study and similar studies suggest that the following factors affect
transfer."4
1. Mastery of the Material. Bransford and Schwartz start with
what should be the obvious: You cannot transfer what you do not
know.8 If students do not learn the material that is to be transferred,
they cannot transfer that information to the new task.
According to Bransford and Schwartz, this factor explains why, in at
least some of the studies of classical transfer, the subjects did not
transfer what they had learned in one situation to a new situation .
6
To illustrate the point, Bransford and Schwartz cited a series of studies
designed to show whether students who had been taught to debug
programs using the computer language LOGO could transfer those skills
to other areas.8 7 Although in these studies the students did not
transfer what they had learned, a later analysis indicated that the
studies "failed to assess the degree to which LOGO was learned in the
first place" and that more likely than not, the students had not learned
enough about LOGO to form a foundation for transfer.88 Later studies
found transfer when more attention was paid to student learning.
8 9
2. Learning for Understanding. The way in which students
master the material also matters. The National Research Council
argues in How People Learn that students who "learn with understand-
ing" are more likely to be able to transfer what they have learned than
students who have only learned to mimic a set of fixed procedures.90
84. See, e.g., Bransford & Schwartz, Rethinking Transfer, supra note 13, at 63-65; NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 51-78.
85. See Bransford & Schwartz, Rethinking Transfer, supra note 13, at 63-64; NAVL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 53.
86. Bransford & Schwartz, Rethinking Transfer, supra note 13, at 63-64.
87. Id. (discussing David Klahr & Sharon McCoy Carver, Cognitive Objectives in a
LOGO Debugging Curriculum: Instruction, Learning, and Transfer, 20 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
362 (1988)); see also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 53.
88. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 55; accord, e.g., Bransford & Schwartz,
Rethinking Transfer, supra note 13, at 63-64 (citing e.g., Klahr & Carver, supra note 87).
89. Joan Littlefield et al., Learning LOGO: Method of Teaching, Transfer of General
Skills, and Attitudes Toward School and Computers, in TEACHING AND LEARNING
COMPUTER PROGRAMMING: MULTIPLE RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES 111 (Richard E. Mayer ed.,
1988); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 55 (citing Klahr & Carver, supra note
87).
90. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 55.
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This is not to say that facts are not important. To the contrary, the
National Research Council emphasizes that the research on expertise in
areas such as chess, history, science, and mathematics establishes that
experts in these fields have a rich and deep knowledge of the facts
related to their area of expertise.91 The research distinguishes, though,
between usable knowledge and lists of disconnected facts.92 As the
National Research Council notes, "[e]xperts' knowledge is connected and
organized around important concepts (for example, Newton's second law
of motion); it is 'conditionalized' to specify the contexts in which it is
applicable; it supports understanding and transfer (to other contexts)
rather than only the ability to remember."93
For example, contrast the way students are taught about arteries with
the way experts think about them. 4 The typical biology textbook sets
out facts about veins and arteries, and on tests, students are asked to
answer questions like the following:
1. Arteries
a. Are more elastic than veins
b. Carry blood that is pumped from the heart
c. Are less elastic than veins
d. Both a and b
e. Both b and c9"
While both students and experts can answer this question, the ways
in which the typical student and the typical expert think about veins
and arteries are very different.9" While the typical student might be
able to parrot information that he or she has memorized, the expert not
only knows the facts but also understands them.97 Experts know why
veins and arteries have particular properties. They know that blood
pumped from the heart exits in spurts and that the elasticity of the
arteries helps accommodate pressure changes."8 They know that the
blood from the heart needs to move upward to the brain and also
downward and that the elasticity of an artery permits it to function as
91. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 9 (citing William G. Chase & Herbert
A. Simon, Perception in Chess, 4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 55 (1973); Michelene T. H. Chi, Paul
J. Feltovich & Robert Glaser, Categorization and Representation of Physics Problems by
Experts and Novices, 5 COGNITIVE SC. 121 (1981)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
HeinOnline  -- 59 Mercer L. Rev. 690 2006-2008
DID HARVARD GET IT RIGHT?
a one-way valve that closes at the end of each spurt and prevents the
blood from flowing backward.99 Because the experts "understand" these
facts, they are better able to transfer their knowledge of arteries to a
project requiring them to design artificial arteries. 0 0
3. Use of Concrete Examples. There is some evidence that the use
of case-based, problem-based, or project-based learning enhances initial
learning.0 ° There is, however, also evidence that information and
procedures learned in this way can impede transfer if the information or
procedures are tied too closely to a particular content. 02 For example,
researchers at the Cognition and Technology Group at Vanderbilt found
that if students learn a concept in only one context, they are not usually
able to transfer what they have learned to other contexts. 0 3
There are, however, some solutions. Although time consuming, one
solution is to have students solve the same or similar problems in a
variety of different contexts. 10 4 A second, more efficient solution is to
have the student solve one problem but then engage them in a "what if"
discussion in which the students are presented with a number of
different hypotheticals. 0 5 A third solution is to ask students to create
a solution that would solve a class of related problems.'
4. Metacognition. While there is still much research to be done,
there are studies that suggest that teachers can increase transfer by
helping students monitor and reflect upon the strategies that they use
99. Id.
100. Id.; see also JOHN D. BRANSFORD & BARRY S. STEIN, THE IDEAL PROBLEM SOLVER:
A GUIDE FOR IMPROVING THINKING, LEARNING, AND CREATlITY (2d ed. 1993).
101. Bransford & Schwartz, Rethinking Transfer, supra note 13, at 64-65.
102. Id.; see, e.g., THE COGNITION AND TECHNOLOGY GROUP AT VANDERBILT, THE JASPER
PROJECT: LESSONS IN CURRICULUM, INSTRUCTION, ASSESSMENT, AND PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT (1997) [hereinafter CTGV, THE JASPER PROJECT].
103. CTGV, THE JASPER PROJECT, supra note 102, at 136, discussed in Bransford &
Schwartz, Rethinking Transfer, supra note 13, at 64-65.
104. See id., discussed in Bransford & Schwartz, Rethinking Transfer, supra note 13,
at 64.
105. See id., discussed in Bransford & Schwartz, Rethinking Transfer, supra note 13,
at 64.
106. See id., discussed in Bransford & Schwartz, Rethinking Transfer, supra note 13,
at 64; see also John Bransford et al., Designs for Environments That Invite and Sustain
Mathematical Thinking, in SYMBOLIZING AND COMMUNICATING IN MATHEMATICS
CLASSROOMS: PERSPECTIVES ON DISCOURSE, TOOLS AND INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN 275, 319
(Paul Cobb, Erna Yackel & Kay McClain eds., 2000) [hereinafter Bransford et al., Designs].
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in learning and solving problems."0 7 In one intervention study, Masui
and De Corte trained college freshman in self-orienting and self-judging
in the context of a business economics course.'0 s
Orienting is a cognitive self-regulation activity, and involves
preparing oneself to learn and solve problems by examining givens and
characteristics of the task, by thinking of possible and desirable goals
and cognitive activities, and by taking account of prior knowledge,
interest, capacities, and contextual factors. Self-judging is a motiva-
tional self-regulation activity related to orienting; indeed, orienting
activities relating to a given task provide opportunities to assess one's
personal qualities and competencies (e.g., prior knowledge and
attitudes) as a learner and problem solver. Self-judging is motivational
in the sense that it helps students to make an accurate appraisal of the
effort needed to accomplish a task successfully."0 9
To test the effect of this training, Masui and De Corte compared the
students who had received the training to two control groups on two
measures in a different course, statistics. To measure self-regulating,
the students were asked how much they thought that they would have
to invest in the theoretical and practical parts of the course; to measure
self-judging, the students were asked whether they thought that the
statistics course would be easy or difficult.110 Based on results that
showed that the students who had received the training did much better
on both measures than the students in the control group, Masui and De
Corte concluded that students who had received the training were able
to transfer, or productively use, the acquired cognitive and motivational
skills in a novel context."'
107. Bransford & Schwartz, Rethinking Transfer, supra note 13, at 65. See also
SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at 61, 71-74 (students learn best when they can 'reflect on" their
knowledge and performance in relation to models supplied by the teacher). The authors
give two examples to illustrate how metacognition enhances learning in law school. Id. at
72-74. In the first example, a civil procedure professor asked his class to discuss what they
thought a jurisdiction case showed about how lawyers think, thus leading students in the
class to take a metacognitive stance on what they were learning. Id. at 73. In the second
example, students break into small groups every week and consider opposing articles on
torts policy related to the doctrines they were studying in class. Id. at 73-74. Evaluating
the contrasting points of view prompted the students to evaluate the case law from a meta-
cognitive level. Id. at 74.
108. Chris Masui & Erik De Corte, Enhancing Learning and Problem Solving Skills:
Orienting and Self-Judging, Two Powerful and Trainable Learning Tools, 9 LEARNING &
INSTRUCTION 517 (1999), discussed in De Corte, supra note 59, at 144.
109. De Corte, supra note 59, at 144.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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5. Deliberate Practice. Finally, the National Research Council
discussed the time that it takes for an individual to master a complex
subject."2 Although talent probably plays a role in who becomes an
expert, even talented individuals take a great deal of time to develop
expertise.113 For instance, a number of individuals have estimated
that it requires between 50,000 and 100,000 hours to become a world-
class chess master."4 Similarly, as F.M. Shea has noted, law school
is "a three year introductory course to at least a decade of legal educa-
tion."115
However, the amount of time an individual spends learning does not
by itself determine expertise." 6 According to the National Research
Council, "learning is most effective when people engage in 'deliberate
practice' that includes active monitoring of one's learning experienc-
es."117  An important part of this deliberate practice is feedback:
"[Situdents need feedback about the degree to which they know when,
where, and how to use the knowledge they are learning. ""'
One way to help students learn when, where, and how to use the
knowledge that they are learning is through the use of "contrasting
cases."" 9 Contrasting cases can help individuals notice particular
features that might have previously escaped their attention and to learn
which features are, and are not, relevant to a particular concept.
120
For example, young children learn how to use the word "dog" by
comparing dogs to cats, cows, and other animals, and adults learn about
wines by comparing and contrasting two or more glasses of wine side by
side.
112. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 58.
113. Id. (citing K. Anders Ericsson, RalfTh. Krampe & Clemens Tesch-Rdmer, The Role
of Deliberate Practice in the Acquisition of Expert Performance, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 363
(1993)).
114. Id. at 56 (citing Chase & Simon, supra note 91).
115. Francis M. Shea, Legal Education-For What? Changing Perspectives 1935-1962,
12 BUFF. L. REV. 270, 272 (1963), cited in Peter W. Gross, On Law School Training in
Analytic Skill, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 261, 265 (1973).
116. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 58-59.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 59.
119. Id. at 60.
120. Id.
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The following example illustrates the power of contrasting cases.
Begin by describing Figure 1, which is taken, with the permission of the
authors, from Rethinking Transfer1 2
Figure 1
A B C
DEF
GHI
If you are like most of the individuals who have participated in studies
involving Figure 1, you did not mention that each of the "parts" is the
same size and shape.122 If, however, you were presented with both
Figure 1 and Figure 2, your descriptions would, more likely than not,
mention the size and shape of the boxes.123 See the following figures
which are reprinted from Efficiency and Innovation in Transfer and
Rethinking Transfer, with the permission of the authors.
121. Bransford & Schwartz, Rethinking Transfer, supra note 13, at 71.
122. Id. (discussing the study from WENDELL R. GARNER, THE PROCESSING OF
INFORMATION AND STRUCTURE (1974)).
123. Id. at 72.
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Figure 1
A B C
D E F
G H I
Figure 2
A D G
B E H
C F I
As this example illustrates, we often define an object in terms of the
"'field' of alternatives. " 1 24 Thus, according to Bransford and Schwartz,
"[iun Broudy's (1977) terms, this field becomes something that we 'know
with'; it affects what we notice about subsequent events."125
What we notice, however, is also influenced by the questions that we
are asked. 126  Look, for example, at the following advertisement, taken
from Rethinking Transfer, with the permission of the authors.
127
Which features are the most important?
124. Id. at 71.
125. Id. at 71-72.
126. Id. at 72.
127. Id. at 73.
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Without knowing how one would use the grids, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to decide which features are the most important." If,
however, one is told to pick a grid for the back of a T-shirt designed to
facilitate back-scratching, one can come up with criteria for determining
which features are most important.'29
Figure 3
A &!
1. The ORIGINAL Grid
Simple, elegan: the original Grid
Order yours today
Approximately I ft x 1 f.
3. The Rounded Grid
A B Aesthetinallypeasing.
Be the envy ofall yourfriends.
1-1 :E T .......
Approtately IfA x Ift.
BK J
5. A 2 in x 2 in Version of
"Intricate Designs*
4 i Easy to carty.
* A great personal gif.
Appratimately 2 in. x 2 in.
7. The Random Grid
H( Uited quantitie.
Fun and challenging.
Approximately ]ft. x I ft.
2. A 5 ft; x Sft. Version
of the Originall
Rigger and better. A B
And amazingly. the
same price as the Original r
Appronximely 5ft. x5ft
4. *Intricate Designs"
Slightly more expensi o . . * .t . 1
but wah the pice. 'I
Approximately I 'k x t
6. OPrecision Personified"
Intricate & exacting.
Just the qualites you
,wu in a grid
Appr, imuady 1tf x I ft
128. Id.; see Bransford et al., Designs, supra note 106.
129. Bransford et al., Designs, supra note 106, cited in Bransford & Schwartz,
Rethinking Transfer, supra note 13, at 72-73.
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C. Adaptive Expertise130
As Schwartz, Branford, and Sears note, the classical definition of
transfer and their broader definition have different focuses: while the
classical definition is primarily concerned with efficiency, 3 ' the
broader definition looks further to innovation. 3 2  Efficiency and
innovation are not, however, mutually exclusive.'3 3
//
/
I-
I/
/
/
/
/
/
//
/
//
/
Efficiency
130. Giyoo Hatano may have been the first researcher to use the phrase "adaptive
expertise." See Giyoo Hatano, Cognitive Consequences of Practice in Culture Specific
Procedural Skills, 4 Q. NEWSL. LABORATORY COMP. HUM. COGNITION 15, 15-18 (1982).
131. See Bransford, Schwartz & Sears, Efficiency and Innovation in Transfer, supra
note 8, at 4-5, 28-29.
132. See id. at 29-34.
133. Id. at 28, 30; see also Giyoo Hatano & Kayoko Inagaki, Two Courses of Expertise,
in CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION IN JAPAN 262, 262-72 (Harold Stevenson, Hiroshi
Azuma & Kenji Hakuta eds., 1986).
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Thus, instead of treating efficiency and innovation as two separate
continuums and trying to maximize efficiency or maximize innovation,
Schwartz, Bransford, and Sears suggest that the goal should be to create
an "optimal adaptability corridor."'34 The diagram above is reprinted
from Efficiency and Innovation in Transfer, with the permission of the
authors."'
Schwartz, Bransford, and Sears's approach is attractive because it
forces us to think beyond the established categories of learning and
transfer, and beyond efficiency and innovation. Although we need
individuals who can solve routine, or commonly encountered, problems
quickly and correctly, we also need individuals who can innovate, or
construct solutions, to novel problems. For instance, although we need
doctors who can quickly and accurately diagnose our child's ear infection,
we also need doctors who can diagnose a rare disease. Similarly, while
we need lawyers who can handle routine transactions, we also need
lawyers who can handle those cases that raise issues of first impression.
While there are a large number of studies that have examined the
types of teaching methods that foster the development of routine
expertise, 3 ' there are relatively few that have looked at the types of
teaching methods that foster the development of adaptive expertise.137
In one of these studies, Martin and Schwartz taught nine- and ten-year
olds to solve problems involving fractions using either pie-shaped pieces,
which made it easy for students to see the "whole," or rectangular-
shaped tiles, which were more difficult to see as a whole. 38 To
determine the effect that these different initial learning experiences had
on subsequent learning, at the end of each day the researchers had both
groups of children solve problems that involved different materials.
39
For example, they asked the children to solve problems using bars,
134. Bransford, Schwartz & Sears, Efficiency and Innovation in Transfer, supra note
8, at 37.
135. Id. at 38.
136. See, e.g., Richard S. Prawat, Promoting Access to Knowledge, Strategy, and
Disposition in Students: A Research Synthesis, 59 REV. EDUC. RES. 1 (1989).
137. See, e.g., Susan M. Barnett & Barbara Koslowski, Adaptive Expertise: Effects of
Type of Experience and the Level of Theoretical Understanding It Generates, 8 THINKING &
REASONING 237, 258 (2002).
138. Taylor Martin & Daniel L. Schwartz, Physically Distributed Learning: Adapting
and Reinterpreting Physical Environments in the Development of Fraction Concepts, 29
COGNITIVE Sci. 587, 592-93 (2005), discussed in Bransford, Schwartz & Sears, Efficiency
and Innovation in Transfer, supra note 8, at 39-41.
139. Id., discussed in Bransford, Schwartz & Sears, Efficiency and Innovation in
Transfer, supra note 8, at 39-41.
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which are analogous to the pie-shaped pieces in that it is easy to see the
whole, and using beans, which are analogous to the tiles.
140
The students were tested on two measures: (1) whether they gave the
right answer, a measure of efficiency, and (2) whether they arranged the
pieces correctly, a measure of innovation.' 4 ' Although the students
who worked with the pie-shaped pieces did better at first, their learning
curve was much less stable: they often got stuck, and from one day to
the next, they often regressed. 142 In contrast, the students who worked
with the tile-shaped pieces had a much more stable learning curve: they
rarely got stuck, and they were much less likely to regress from one day
to the next. 4 3 Thus, this study suggests that early innovation produc-
es more innovation in the short run and better efficiency in the long
run.14 See the following diagram, which is reprinted from Efficiency
and Innovation in Transfer with the permission of the authors. 4 5
t
Increase in % of - .
EFFICIENT Responses
140. Id., discussed in Bransford, Schwartz & Sears, Efficiency and Innovation in
Transfer, supra note 8, at 39-41.
141. See id. at 593.
142. Id. at 594-96.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 597-98.
145. Bransford, Schwartz & Sears, Efficiency and Innovation in Transfer, supra note
8, at 40.
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While there are very few studies that look at methods for helping
students develop adaptive expertise, there are a number of studies that
compare the ways in which novices, usually college students, and experts
solve problems. In one of the most famous of these studies, Chi,
Feltovich, and Glaser compared the ways in which experts and novices
solved physics problems.'46 What they discovered is consistent with
the theories related to transfer. While the experts tended to use theories
to categorize the problems, the novices categorized the problems based
on their surface features.'47
In another study, Barnett and Koslowski read college students and
two types of experts, business consultants and restaurant managers, a
story about a hypothetical restaurant and then asked four open-ended
questions related to challenges facing the restaurant. 4 ' Although the
business consultants did not have experience working in or with
restaurants, they did substantially better on the reasoning problems
than the restaurant managers, who did only slightly better than the
college students.'49 In discussing their findings, Barnett and Koslow-
ski concluded that the experts did not successfully transfer their
expertise to the novel problems because they were "bound by the
specifics of their own experience." 5 ° In contrast, the business consul-
tants, who engaged in more theory-based reasoning, were able to
transfer what they knew to the new problems.'5 '
Other studies highlight other differences between experts and novices.
For example, individuals with adaptive expertise seem to understand the
limits of their own expertise, and when they do not possess the requisite
expertise, they either research the issue or seek out individuals who do
have that expertise.'52 In one article, Sam Wineburg compared the
results of two studies: one in which he asked two groups of college
students, history majors and non-history majors, to interpret some
146. Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, supra note 91, at 121-22.
147. Id. at 144-47.
148. Barnett & Koslowski, supra note 137, at 240.
149. Barnett and Koslowski compared each individual's response to responses from two
"super-experts," professors whose work focused on restaurant management and who had
previously managed restaurants. Id. at 242-43.
150. Id. at 247.
151. Id. at 245-46; see also Kevin Dunbar, How Scientists Really Reason: Scientific
Reasoning in Real-World Laboratories, in THE NATURE OF INSIGHT 365 (Robert J. Sternberg
& Janet E. Davidson eds., 1995); James F. Voss et al., Problem-Solving Skill in the Social
Sciences, in 17 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION: ADVANCES IN RESEARCH
THEORY 165 (Gordon H. Bower ed., 1983).
152. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 47-48; Bransford, Schwartz &
Sears, Efficiency and Innovation in Transfer, supra note 8, at 30-31.
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complex decisions made by Abraham Lincoln, and another in which he
asked two American history experts, one who specialized in the Civil
War and one who did not, to do the same.153  Although the college
students showed a high degree of confidence in their interpretations,
their interpretations were flawed because they based their interpreta-
tions on assumptions based on their own experiences."54 In contrast,
the second history expert realized that he did not know enough Civil
War history to interpret Abraham Lincoln's decisions and, after careful
rereading, created a context within the passages to answer his own
questions.'55
The studies also show that novices sometimes get worse before they
get better. In a study involving medical residents, Alan Lesgold and five
other authors found that on some tasks, residents with three to four
years of experience performed worse than experts and less experienced
residents.' 56 According to Lesgold, an imperfect framework or theory
may be worse than no framework or theory, even if having an imperfect
theory may be a necessary step toward building a better theory.'57
In summary, these studies and others like them suggest that
individuals with adaptive expertise have the following characteristics:
1. They have a deep knowledge of their subject area.
2. They recognize patterns of meaningful information. For example,
if a novice chess player and an expert chess player are shown a chess
board with the chess pieces in acceptable positions for a few seconds, the
expert chess player will do a better job replicating the configuration than
the novice. 5 ' However, if the chess pieces are placed on the board in
a random way, the expert will not do any better than the novice. 9
3. They are able to recognize the patterns because they focus on
structures and not just surface features. For example, while the novice
153. Sam Wineburg, Reading Abraham Lincoln: An Expert/Expert Study in the
Interpretation of Historical Texts, 22 COGNITIVE SCI. 319, 321, 338 (1998) (citing Samuel
S. Wineburg & Janice Fournier, Contextualized Thinking in History, in COGNITIVE AND
INSTRUCTIONAL PROCESSES IN HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 285, 285-308 (Mario
Carretero & James F. Voss eds., 1994)).
154. Id. at 338.
155. Id. at 336-37. In other words, as Wineburg puts it, "Novice readers encounter the
past in primary documents and judge it. [Experts] encounter[] the past.. . and learn[]
from it." Id. at 338; see also Blasi, supra note 5, at 344-45.
156. Alan Lesgold et al., Expertise in a Complex Skill: Diagnosing X-Ray Pictures, in
THE NATURE OF EXPERTISE 311, 334-35 (Michelene T. H. Chi, Robert Glaser & Marshall
J. Farr eds., 1988).
157. Id.; see also Annette Karmiloff-Smith & Birbel Inhelder, "If You Want to Get
Ahead, Get a Theory," 3 COGNITION 195 (1974).
158. Chase & Simon, supra note 91, at 55-56.
159. Id. at 56.
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chess player may focus at least part of his or her attention on the
materials from which the pieces are made, the expert would not.
160
Instead, the expert would try to match the configuration to a configura-
tion that he or she knows.
161
4. They can access their knowledge because they know not only
information but also when that information is useful.
5. They are willing to question and even let go of initial assump-
tions.
6. They actively seek out information that they need to solve a
problem.
III. PART III: NEW TASK
Presume for a moment that you have been asked to teach a group of
first-year law students about adverse possession. Spend some time
evaluating the first three class plans and developing your own alterna-
tive.
A. Plan A: Lecture
Before class, have students read the section on consideration in a
property hornbook and write a one- to two-page summary of what they
have read. In class, present a lecture in which you explain the key
principles and describe cases in which the courts have applied those
principles.
B. Plan B: Casebook Method
For each class, have students read several cases. In class, question
the students, asking them to summarize the key facts, to set out the
issue, and to explain and evaluate the courts' holdings and reasoning.
C. Plan C: Casebook Method plus Lecture
For the first one or two classes, have students read cases. In class,
have students identify and discuss any interesting patterns that they
have noted. In the last class, lecture: explain the key principles and
summarize and explain the cases that the students read and analyzed.
160. Id. at 68.
161. Id. at 79-80.
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D. Plan D
Given the research and your own experiences, devise another method
that might help students develop both the routine and adaptive expertise
that they will need to handle adverse possession cases.
IV. PART IV: A CRITIQUE OF LAW SCHOOL TEACHING METHODS
More likely than not, there is not a single method that will be effective
in teaching law students not only the law but also how to think like a
lawyer. Unlike fairy godmothers, law school professors do not have
magic wands that they can use to turn law students into competent
lawyers, let alone lawyers with adaptive expertise. That does not,
however, mean that law professors should not do what Langdell did and
innovate.
A. Critique of Plan A (Lecture)
Plan A is, essentially, Detterman's plan. 162 While Detterman taught
his psychology students the basic principles of psychology and then used
examples to illustrate those principles, a law professor would teach his
or her students legal principles and use cases or hypotheticals to
illustrate those principles. According to Detterman, the primary
advantage of this method is that it does not rely on transfer.
163
Instead of hoping that students will transfer what they have learned or
using "tricks" to enhance transfer, Detterman and the law professor
would simply teach their students what they want them to know.
At least in theory, the law professor could use this method not only to
teach students the law but also to teach them the analytical skills and
other skills they will need in practice. For example, a professor could
describe the process of reading, analyzing, and briefing cases and then
provide students with examples of how others have read, analyzed, and
briefed a group of cases. Similarly, a professor could explain how to
construct an argument and then provide the students with examples of
arguments."1
There are, however, some problems with this approach. Although
reading assignments and lectures may be an efficient way of providing
students with information, the research indicates that students
162. See Detterman, supra note 11, at 17.
163. Id.
164. This is easier said than done. As those who have tried can attest, it is very
difficult to "deconstruct" the processes that attorneys use in reading statutes and cases, in
developing a theory of the case, or in constructing arguments.
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remember very little of what they read and hear (think Five-Minute
University). In addition, even when students remember what they read
and hear, it is unlikely that they will be able to apply that information
to similar, let alone novel, situations. As most Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC") professors will attest, students seem to remember very
little of what they learned in their Contracts course, and, unless
specifically prompted to do so, they do not apply the principles, or
underlying structures, that they learned in Contracts to solve the
problems that they encounter in Sales (think fortresses and tumors).
More importantly, though, Plan A violates one of Detterman's primary
principles: Detterman believes that one should teach people exactly
what one wants them to learn in a situation as close as possible to the
one in which the learning will be applied.1" Teaching students legal
principles in a law school classroom is very different from teaching
students how to practice law.
B. Critique of Plan B (The Casebook Method)
In many ways, the casebook method is a product of its times.
In the postbellumn era, American universities were influenced by
European scholarship that emphasized the "scientific method" and the
pursuit of objective or universal truths. Seeking a place in the new
universities, law schools, led by Langdell, recognized that they would
have to conform to this new model of a university discipline. In sum,
legal scholarship and education had to become "scientific.""
Thus, Langdell viewed law as a science and carefully selected
appellate court decisions as the "specimens" from which students could,
through the scientific method, discover general principles. 16 7  In
addition, Langdell advocated the use of what is often referred to as the
Socratic method, where instead of lecturing, Langdell would ask
students questions designed to help them identify not only the specifics
of each case but also more general legal principles.
16
1
165. See Detterman, supra note 11, at 17.
166. Keith A. Findley, Rediscovering the Lawyer School: Curriculum Reform in
Wisconsin, 24 WIS. INT'L L.J. 295, 297-98 (2006) (footnote omitted).
167. See Kara Abramson, "Art for a Better Life:" A New Image of American Legal
Education, 2006 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 227 (2006). Langdell's innovations in 1870 at Harvard
Law School have been traced to "[Charles] Eliot's travels to Europe in 1863 to observe
educational systems on the Continent and, in particular, medical education and its clinical
paradigm." Marc Feldman & Jay M. Feinman, Legal Education: Its Cause and Cure, 82
MICH. L. REV. 914, 919 (1984) (reviewing ROBERT STEVENS, LAw SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980S (1983)).
168. Abramson, supra note 167, at 230.
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However, from the very beginning, Langdell's methods were controver-
sial.
As the enrollments in Langdell's case-method courses tumbled to a few
students, President Eliot took the extraordinary step of calling
students, including [Franklin G.] Fessenden [who was later a Massa-
chusetts Superior Court Justice], into his office to ask their opinion of
Langdell's classes. "Fessenden, a first-year student of about three
months, was flabbergasted, but he swallowed his astonishment and
said, 'Well, Mr. President, I can go to Prof. Washburn's lectures and
hear him read a chapter from his book on real property. I can go to
Prof. Parson's lectures and hear him read a chapter from his book. But
I learned to read before I came down here. When I go to Prof.
Langdell's lectures, I get something that I cannot find in any
book.' .
169
The question, of course, is what is that "something" that students get
that they cannot find in any book?
The data analysis plus review of data analysis condition and the
casebook method are similar in that they both require students to work
with primary source material. While the psychology students looked at
studies, law students work with statutes, court rules, and court opinions.
In addition, the methods are similar in that they require the students to
do both analysis and synthesis. The psychology students engaged in
analysis by analyzing and graphing data and in synthesis when they
looked for interesting patterns. Similarly, law students engage in
analysis when they brief a case, identifying the key facts, the issue, the
court's holding, and the court's reasoning, and they engage in synthesis
when they prepare outlines. Finally, the methods are similar in that
there is no lecture that tells the students what they should have learned
from working with the data or from briefing the cases and preparing
outlines. The psychology students were simply told to look again at the
data to see if they had missed anything, and law students are told that
they need to review the cases in light of class discussions of those cases.
There is, however, a key difference between the two methods. In
Schwartz, Bransford, and Sears's studies, the psychology professor did
169. Kimball, supra note 2, at 298 (citing Letters between Charles W. Eliot and
Franklin G. Fessenden (Mar. 28, 1919; Apr. 23, 1919; May 12, 1919; July 15, 1919; July
22, 1919) (on file with the Harvard University Archives)). For more current critiques of the
method, see Philip C. Kissam, The Ideology of the Case Method/Final Examination Law
School, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 137 (2001); Llewellyn, supra note 1; Edwin W. Patterson, The
Case Method in American Legal Education: Its Origins and Objectives, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC.
1 (1951); James Boyd White, Doctrine in a Vacuum: Reflections on What a Law School
Ought (and Ought Not) to Be, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155 (1986).
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not guide the students through the process of analyzing and graphing
the data or through the process of looking for interesting patterns.
17 0
In contrast, most law professors do provide at least some guidance. At
one end of the continuum are those law school professors who take
Detterman's approach and teach their students how to analyze and
synthesize statutes and cases through lectures and examples. At the
other end are professors who simply tell students to read the cases and
then use class time to ask their students questions about those
cases. 171 Whichever method a professor uses, the question is whether
the law school professor's participation in the data analysis activity is
sufficient to make the casebook method more effective than Schwartz,
Bransford, and Sears's data analysis plus review of data analysis
condition, which, as is noted above, produced little transfer. 172
In one of the handful of studies that examined what law students
learn in law school,' 7' Bryden compared third-year law students and
entering first-year law students at three highly ranked law schools on
three measures: (1) the ability to do functional analysis, that is the
ability "to understand the meaning or scope of a rule or category by
reference to its purpose," (2) the ability to distinguish between the
court's holding and dicta, and (3) the ability to engage in statutory
analysis.
74
On the first measure, the ability to do functional analysis, the third-
year law students did substantially better than the entering first-year
170. Schwartz, Bransford & Sears, Efficiency and Innovation in Transfer, supra note
8, at 18-20.
171. Experience indicates that the types of questions that professors ask vary
dramatically. While some professors walk their students through the same set or sets of
questions for each case, others may ask one set of questions for one case and a different
set of questions for another case. In addition, while some professors ask very specific
questions that are designed to make sure that the students have done a close and critical
reading of the case, other professors ask broader questions that ask students to examine
the policies underlying a particular doctrine.
What most professors have in common is that they do not ask their students the types
of questions that practicing attorneys ask themselves when they read a case. For example,
most law school professors do not ask their students how they would advise their clients,
how they would draft a particular document, or how, if they ended up in litigation, they
would use the cases to support their position.
172. See supra chart accompanying note 79.
173. See, e.g., Paul F. Teich, Research on American Law Teaching: Is There a Case
Against the Case System?, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 181 (1986); Morrison Torrey, You Call
that Education?, 19 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 93 (2004).
174. Bryden, supra note 3, at 481. Bryden controlled for substantive legal knowledge
by providing the students with hypothetical statutes and cases. Id. at 484. In addition,
he selected entering first-year students who had very similar LSAT scores to the third-year
students who took the test. Id. at 482.
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students. 7 ' At School I, about half of the third-year students did some
type of functional analysis; at School II, forty-three precent of the
students who took "Exam A" did some type of functional analysis, and
thirty percent of the students who took "Exam B" did some type of
functional analysis; and at School III, thirty-six percent of the third-year
students who took Exam A did some type of functional analysis, and
thirty percent of the students who took Exam B did some type of
functional analysis.17 In contrast, the numbers for the entering first-
year students ranged from zero percent to about ten percent. 77 While
this pilot study indicates that law schools help students learn how to do
functional analysis, as Bryden notes, "even at an excellent [law] school
at least half of the graduates have not acquired this habit."'78
On the second measure, the ability to distinguish a court's holding
from dicta, Bryden's results were inconclusive, in large part because the
questions were not drafted in such a way that students needed to
distinguish between the court's holding and dicta.'79 Nonetheless, of
the third-year students who took Exam A, five percent from School I,
seventeen percent from School II, and twenty percent of the third-year
students from School III mentioned that in one of the decisions, the
court's reference to the applicable exception was in dictum. 180 On the
second exam, Exam B, twenty-eight percent, twenty percent, and thirty
percent of the third-year students made a statement that suggested that
the key sentence in one of the cases was dictum.'8 ' Because the
entering first-year students "could not have made such a technical
point," Bryden did not grade them on this point.8 2
On the third measure, the ability to construe a statute, the third-year
students did better than the entering first-year students.' However,
as with the other two measures, in many instances fewer than half of
the third-year students saw an issue or did the type of analysis that
Bryden wanted."M For example, most of the entering and third-year
students who took Exam A failed to discuss one of the applicable
statutory sections, and only ten percent of the entering students and
twenty-five percent of the third-year students recognized an issue related
175. Id. at 489-91.
176. Id. at 491.
177. Id. at 489-91.
178. Id. at 491.
179. Id. at 494.
180. Id. at 492.
181. Id. at 493 n.51.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 494-500.
184. Id.
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to that section. 8 5 Similarly, on Exam B, the third-year students did
better than the entering students.1 6 For instance, while one-third of
the third-year students talked about what one of the words in the
statute might mean, only fifteen percent of the entering students
did.
87
Interestingly, others have not tried to replicate or improve upon
Bryden's study. 8 As a consequence, the only other measures that we
have are the statements that our students make in class; our students'
answers on exams; the work that they do in their legal writing courses,
trial advocacy courses, clinical courses, and externships; their perfor-
mance on the bar exam; and the work that they do as they move out into
practice.
As Bryden observes, measuring our students' learning based on the
statements they make in class or on the basis of their exam answers is
problematic. 189  Classroom responses tend to measure preparation
rather than the ability to do a particular type of analysis, and the
results may be skewed by the fact that many professors rely on
volunteers, individuals who have raised their hands because they believe
"that they kn[o]w the answer."190 In addition, according to Bryden,
"[n]ew teachers quickly discover that on the whole students do badly on
law school exams."' 91
Better measures may be the work that students do in their legal
writing and other "skills" courses. While no data is available, most legal
writing professors would probably agree that their students do better on
the last memo or brief than they do on their first memo or brief. By the
last assignment, students can do more functional analysis, they do a
better job of both distinguishing between the court's holding and
analyzing a statute. However, most legal writing professors would also
agree that only a few of their students do high-quality analysis. Even
at the end of their first or second year, many students do not distinguish
between the roles that the trial and appellate courts play; do not
understand the standard of review; and do not, unless prompted, do a
systematic analysis of the rules. As well, these same students have a
185. Id. at 494-98.
186. Id. at 498-500.
187. Id. at 499.
188. Some articles have explored the themes of Bryden's study. See, e.g., Paul T.
Wangerin, Skills Training in "Legal Analysis": A Systematic Approach, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV.
409, 415 (1986) (describing a systematic method for teaching dialectical skills to first-year
law students).
189. Bryden, supra note 3, at 480.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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difficult time constructing plain language arguments, analogous case
arguments, and policy arguments. While on the surface, the bar exam
seems to be the best method, it is suspect for two reasons. First, like
most large-scale tests, it is constructed in such a way that no matter
how well or how poorly students do, a prescribed percentage will
pass. 9 2 Second, the bar exam may test knowledge of the law and not
whether students can think like a lawyer.' 93
The research on learning and transfer does, however, highlight the
strengths and weaknesses of the casebook method. When analyzed
under the classical definition of transfer, the casebook method gets low
marks. Because most legal problems are ill-structured, very few
students will be able, at least without a lot of hints, to use the principles
that they draw from a group of cases to work through hypotheticals that
their own professors present, let alone use those principles in other
classes or in practice. This failure to transfer is compounded by the fact
that students seem to contextualize what they learn. For example, as
the studies indicate, students do not use the skills that they learn in
math classes to solve real world problems."9 In addition, while the
casebook method may help students focus on underlying structures
rather than simply the facts of the case, the method is time consuming.
Thus, instead of hoping for transfer, proponents of the classical model of
transfer would urge law school professors to follow Detterman's and not
Langdell's approach.
Under the broader definition of transfer, the casebook method fares
much better. One of the casebook method's strengths is its use of
contrasting examples.'95  According to Bransford and Schwartz,
presenting individuals with more than one example changes the "field
of alternatives," which in turn changes what the individual notices.
196
Thus, the authors of casebooks can highlight particular principles, or the
ways in which those principles have been applied, through their
selection of cases and, in particular, through their selection of contrast-
ing cases. In addition, law school professors can change what students
notice about a particular case through their use of questions. Just as
asking subjects which design would work best for the back of a t-shirt
192. Sam Wineburg, Crazy for History, 90 J. AM. HIST. 1401, 1406-07 (2004).
193. See, e.g., Daniel R. Hansen, Note, Do We Need the Bar Examination? A Critical
Evaluation of the Justifications for the Bar Examination and Proposed Alternatives, 45
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1191, 1213, 1220 (1995) (suggesting that the bar exam rewards
applicants who can recite memorized law but does not test higher level thinking skills).
194. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
195. See Bransford & Schwartz, Rethinking Transfer, supra note 13, at 71-72.
196. Id. at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20081 709
HeinOnline  -- 59 Mercer L. Rev. 709 2006-2008
MERCER LAW REVIEW
designed to facilitate back scratching changed what students notice
about various designs, professors can change the way students read a
case through their choice of questions.
Another strength of the casebook method is its focus on theory. Under
both the classical and broader definition of transfer, transfer is more
likely to occur when individuals focus not only on the surface features
of a problem (for example, the facts of a case) but also on its underlying
structure (the principles that the case illustrates). Thus, to the extent
that law students go beyond analysis and engage in synthesis, they are
more likely to do more sophisticated analysis. Likewise, the casebook
method's focus on theory may help law students develop adaptive
expertise. Just as business consultants were able to use theory and
causal reasoning to solve novel problems, law students who use theory
and causal reasoning may be able to do a better job representing their
clients.'97
Also on the plus side is the fact that, in their study, Bransford and
Sears found that students who have been required to innovate from the
very beginning have a more stable learning curve and, in the long run,
do better on measures of adaptive expertise. 9 ' Just as Martin and
Schwartz's students had to innovate to see the tiles as parts of a whole,
law students have to innovate to construct a body of law from a series
of individual cases.' 99 Finally, also on the plus side is the fact that the
Socratic Method can create the type of disequilibrium that forces
students to re-examine their assumptions and create new knowledge
structures .200
While the current research suggests that the casebook method is more
effective than just a lecture or even a lecture followed by concrete
examples, many students might argue that even if the casebook method
is better than the lecture method, many professors do not use the
method effectively. Instead of using questions to create a disequilibrium
that will allow students to view an issue through a new lens or to
highlight differences between contrasting cases, the professors ask what
appear to many students to be random sets of questions. Although the
professor may have a rationale for the way in which he or she walks
students through cases, that rationale is not communicated, either
indirectly or directly, to the students. Thus, students may complain that
197. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
198. Schwartz, Bransford & Sears, Efficiency and Innovation in Transfer, supra note
8, at 34. See supra notes 136-45 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 138-44 and accompanying text.
200. Schwartz, Bransford & Sears, Efficiency and Innovation in Transfer, supra note
8, at 32.
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the professor is "hiding the ball" when, in fact, what the professor may
be hiding is the method." 1
However, even when the law professor explains the method and uses
it skillfully, students may complain that what they are learning in the
classroom does not prepare them to practice law. For example, the
questions that professors ask are often not the same questions that
students will need to answer if they are to answer a client's question,
draft a document, or mediate a dispute. To some extent, the students
are wrong. The questions that many law school professors who teach
first-year classes ask are related to practice in that they are designed to
familiarize first-year students with the legal system, its rules, and its
language. However, to a great extent, the students are right. In most
law schools, the focus is not on teaching students how to practice law.
As a consequence, students are taught to view legal questions from an
academic rather than a practical perspective and are left on their own
to figure out how to transfer what they have learned in law school to
their practice.2"2
C. Critique of Plan C (Casebook Plus Lecture)
The casebook plus lecture method is, in a modified form, the method
that Schwartz, Bransford, and Sears found works best.2"3 A law
professor who adopts this method would divide each "unit" into two
parts: a data analysis exercise and a lecture.
While the data analysis exercise could take a number of different
forms, it could also be the casebook method. Law professors would have
students read and brief a set of cases and then, in class, the professor
would question the students about the cases, asking questions that force
students to engage in analysis (for example, reading cases closely and
critically) and in synthesis (for example, drawing principles from cases
by comparing and contrasting cases). The professor's use of the casebook
method would not, however, be an end in itself. Instead, the professor
would use the casebook method to prepare students for future learning-
201. Cf. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at 59 (the challenge of any pedagogy is to make the
invisible visible, both in the mind of the teacher and the mind of the learner).
202. See generally ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A
VISION AND A ROAD MAP 97-104 (2007). Stuckey considers the additional problem of law
professors not explicitly connecting what they teach to student's personal morals and
philosophies. Id. at 102-03. Traditional teaching methods and their underlying beliefs can
undermine a student's sense of self-worth, security, authenticity, and competence. Id. at
102. Stuckey proposes using a context-based curriculum in legal education to address the
shortfalls of the casebook method. Id. at 104-16.
203. Id. at 19.
2008] 711
HeinOnline  -- 59 Mercer L. Rev. 711 2006-2008
MERCER LAW REVIEW
learning from a lecture in which the professor explains the cases and the
principles that might be drawn from those cases."°
There are, of course, some problems with the casebook plus lecture
method. For instance, knowing that the professor would provide a
lecture at the end, some students might choose to forgo doing the
reading or forgo engaging in the analysis and synthesis. There are two
ways of responding to this potential problem. First, if students
understood the process and the importance of the data analysis exercise,
they might be less likely to wait for the lecture. Second, the students
who are likely to try shortcuts are probably already doing so. For
example, instead of reading and briefing the cases, these students rely
on commercially prepared case summaries, and instead of preparing
their own outlines, they rely on outlines produced by others.
Some of the advantages of this plan can be seen if law school and bar
review courses are viewed as a single learning experience. One way of
explaining the "aha" moments that many students have while studying
for the bar is that the three years of law school and the casebook method
were a data analysis exercise that prepared students to learn from the
bar review summaries and lectures. These students would have gotten
little from these summaries and lectures as first-year students.
However, law school prepared them for future learning because in
addition to teaching students facts (replicative knowing) and procedures
(applicative knowing), law school provides students with the experiences
and learning that determine what they notice about new situations and
how they frame problems (interpretive knowing). As a result, even if
students are not able to transfer out all of the principles that they
learned during law school, they transfer in interpretive knowledge,
which allows them to learn the material being taught in bar review
courses.215 In the alternative, the "aha" moments can be explained in
terms of relearning. Although students may not remember learning the
material the first time, they did in fact learn something that now
enables them to relearn the same more quickly and, perhaps, from a new
perspective. °6
204. Some professors already use this method. After walking students through a series
of cases, they provide students with a summarizing lecture. In the absence of such a
lecture, other students seek out the equivalent information either in a hornbook or a study
guide.
205. Schwartz, Bransford & Sears, Efficiency and Innovation in Transfer, supra note
8, at 11.
206. Id. at 14.
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The question, of course, is whether Plan C, the data analysis plus
lecture method, prepares students for the practice of law. The answer
is probably the tried and true law school response: It depends.
It depends first on whether the method does in fact work. Although
students who have been taught by the data analysis plus lecture model
have done better on classroom exercises and tests than students taught
through other methods," 7 to date there are no published studies that
have looked at whether the students who have been taught by the data
analysis plus lecture method can transfer what they have learned in the
classroom to the world of work. While Detterman would argue that
these students will not be able to transfer out what they have learned,
Schwartz, Bransford, and Sears would argue that, at a minimum,
students will be able to transfer in what they learned and that they can
use that learning to facilitate additional learning.
More likely than not, whether the method works also depends on the
types of data analysis exercises that students are given and the nature
of the lecture. At least in theory, data analysis exercises that resemble,
in some authentic way, a problem that an attorney might face in practice
are more likely to produce learning that can transfer to practice than
exercises that are more academic in nature. At least for second-semester
and upper-division students, problems like those presented in George-
town's Week One program 0 8 are more likely to result in transfer than
the more typical case analysis classes. In addition, for the lectures "to
work," they will have to do more than just summarize cases; professors
will need to present the principles, the reasoning that has led to the
development or modification of those principles, and how those principles
might be applied in practice.
D. Critique of Plan D
Like Plan C, Plan D rejects the classical definition of transfer and
adopts the broader definitions that assume that knowledge is construct-
ed and that transfer needs to be viewed in terms of preparation for
future learning. In addition, the goal of Plan D is to help students
develop not only routine expertise but also adaptive expertise.
1. Description of Plan D. Because few first-year students have
had experience working with the law, law schools should prepare
students for law school by offering an orientation program that
emphasizes the basics. For example, law schools should offer "data
207. See id. at 19.
208. For a description of the program, see Week One: Law in a Global Context,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/documents/weekone2006.pdf (last visited Feb. 29, 2008).
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analysis" exercises that prepare students to learn about the roles the
various branches of government play in the United States legal system,
the differences between trial and appellate courts, and the types of
arguments lawyers make. One way of doing this would be to present
students with a problem and have them draft a statute that would solve
that problem. Once the statute has been "enacted," students would be
given a new fact pattern and the task of using the statute to advise a
client about what the client can and cannot do under the statute. The
students could then litigate a case concerning that statute, playing both
the roles of the attorneys and the roles of trial and appellate judges.
While the students would undoubtedly make what law professors and
practitioners would label as "mistakes," the professors could use those
mistakes as catalysts for future learning.
Building on the students' experiences with these data analysis
exercises, law schools could provide first-year students with lectures on
what might seem like very basic information. For instance, using the
exercises as starting points, the lectures could correct students'
misconceptions about the roles that the three branches of government
play, the relationships between the federal and state systems, the role
of trial courts and appellate courts, and the different types of legal
analysis and legal arguments.
With this foundation, first-year students would then be prepared to
begin their regular courses. Relying on existing research, law school
professors could then change the ways in which they teach these classes
in small, but important, ways. For instance, in teaching students a
particular doctrine, law school professors could walk students through
the following four steps that are designed to enhance both learning and
transfer.
Step 1: Preparation for Learning. Instead of starting a particular
unit with a set of cases or a lecture, the professor would have his or her
students do an exercise that requires the students to explore that area
of law or concept. For example, relying on Bransford and Sears's
research, the professor might have the students read two or three short
cases and note any interesting patterns. In the alternative, the
professor could try to create a less-academic exercise that not only
prepares students for future learning but also demonstrates how experts
approach a problem when they do not know the answer. For instance,
the professor might tell the students that they are scheduled to meet
with a client who has a question related to the area of law or concept
that the students are about to study. What would an expert do in the
same situation? What resources would the expert consult in preparing
for the interview? What questions would the expert ask during the
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interview? Taking yet another approach, the professor might create an
exercise that contextualizes the issues that the students are about to
study by presenting the students with a case similar to one that they are
likely to encounter in practice and asking students to talk about possible
outcomes.
Step 2: Analysis of the Statutes and Cases. The next step would be
to have the law students read the cases in their casebooks. Early in the
first year, the professor's primary role would be similar to that of a
skilled chess player teaching someone to play chess. Just as the chess
teacher might begin by describing the chess board and explaining the
moves that each piece can make, the law professor would describe the
legal system and the roles that attorneys, trial judges, and appellate
judges play within that system. Similarly, just as the chess teacher
would help the new player learn what to look for on the chess board and
teach the new players some of the most common moves, the law
professor would help students learn what to look for in statutes and
cases and help students learn to recognize common legal strategies.
Once the students have mastered the basics, both the chess teacher
and the law professor can move on to teaching their students more
sophisticated strategies. However, in doing so, the professor would want
to use teaching techniques that are likely to promote both transfer and
the development of adaptive expertise. Thus, professors would
emphasize the underlying structures of not only the opinions themselves
but also of the legal system and the particular area of law. For instance,
once the students have read and analyzed a group of cases, the
professors would help them synthesize those cases. Did each of the
courts apply the same rule? How are the rules the same or different?
Did all of the courts employ the same reasoning? How is the reasoning
in one case the same or different as the reasoning in other cases? What
are the pros and cons of each line of reasoning?
Step 3: "Lecture". At the end of the unit the professor would help the
students "interpret" what they learned. Although the professor could do
this through a lecture, the professor could also choose to use questions.
Regardless of the approach, the professor would focus not on the surface
features of particular cases but instead on underlying structures. For
example, the professor would make sure that students understand how
a particular doctrine is related to other doctrines, the policies underlying
the doctrine, the doctrine itself, and which facts are legally significant
(and which are not). In addition, the professor would work with
students to help them develop both routine and adaptive expertise. To
help students develop routine expertise, the professor would walk the
students through numerous examples of routine cases; to help students
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develop adaptive expertise, the professor would present students with
novel cases and model for them the ways in which an expert attorney
might approach each case.
Step 4: Transfer Activity. This last step would be designed to help
students transfer what they have learned through different exercises.
These exercises should be designed not only to help students transfer
what they have learned to other problems they will encounter in law
school (for example, on their exams) but also to transfer what they have
learned to problems that they will encounter in practice. At least
initially, the focus of these exercises should be on helping students
develop routine expertise. When they are presented with a routine
problem, can they identify the issue? Do they know the rule? Can they
apply the rule? Can they make the standard types of arguments? Once
students have demonstrated routine expertise, they can be presented
with more novel problems that require them to innovate new ways of
reading or applying the law and to use the strategies that experts use
when they do not know the answer to a question.
2. Critique of Plan D. Plan D is, for the most part, consistent with
the research relating to learning, transfer, and the development of
routine and adaptive expertise.20 9 While it recognizes the importance
of providing law students with a body of knowledge, it also recognizes
that unless students are prepared to learn that information, they
remember little of what they read or what they are told. Thus, relying
on Schwartz, Bransford, and Sears's work, Plan D incorporates exercises
designed to prepare students for learning, recognizing that when
students have been prepared to learn, lectures can be effective.2 10
Plan D also incorporates many of the techniques that have been shown
to promote transfer. Under Plan D, professors would provide their
students with multiple examples and have students focus not only on the
surface features of particular cases or doctrines (for example, the facts
in a particular case or the black letter law) but also on their underlying
structures (for example, the policies underlying a particular doctrine).
Additionally, professors would present problems not in the law school
context but in the context in which students will encounter the problems
in practice, thus further promoting transfer.
Finally, Plan D would help students develop both routine and adaptive
expertise. Professors could provide students with protocols that they can
use to solve routine problems, and students could practice applying those
209. See supra Part II.C.
210. See supra Part II.C.
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protocols. Additionally, professors could help students develop the habits
that they will need to develop adaptive expertise by helping students
recognize the complexity of the law, by helping them challenge their
assumptions, and by showing them how to learn new materials and
construct or invent new solutions to problems. If done properly, the
first-year curriculum would prepare students not only for the more
doctrine-intensive upper-division classes, but also for practice.
There are, of course, downsides to Plan D. The first is that it requires
professors to change, in varying degrees, how they are teaching their
courses, and change requires both a willingness to engage in invention
and time and energy.
The second is that Plan D requires more time than a lecture or the
traditional case method. It will take professors time to create high
quality data analysis and transfer exercises, and while some of the
exercises could be done outside of the classroom, some of them will need
to be done in the classroom, which will take up valuable class time. The
best response to this argument is a reference back to the Five-Minute
University.2 ' It is better to cover less material, have students actual-
ly learn that material, and be able to use what they have learned than
to cover more and have students not remember it five years later.
Finally, Plan D requires even more of first-year law students. While
most students would not label the traditional casebook method as a
passive form of learning, the Plan D exercises will require students to
be even more actively involved in the learning process. In addition, Plan
D does not get rid of the casebook method; professors will still call on
students, questioning them in a way that creates "a sense of disequilibri-
um."
2 12
V. CONCLUSION
Although there are those who would disagree, it appears that Langdell
and Harvard almost got it right. Langdell got it right in that students
are more likely to develop adaptive expertise if, from the beginning, they
engage in activities that require them to analyze data and invent their
own solutions. He got it wrong, however, in not having students engage
in that analysis and invention in environments that resembled, as
closely as possible, the environments in which students would be using
what they learned. In addition, Langdell got it wrong when he relied
solely on the casebook method. Having prepared students to learn, he
211. See supra text accompanying notes 6-10.
212. Schwartz, Bransford & Sears, Efficiency and Innovation in Transfer, supra note
8, at 32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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should have added lectures or exercises that corrected misconceptions
and made explicit the principles that he wanted students to learn.
Finally, Langdell could have modeled for students how experts seek out
and use various resources to solve novel problems.
Langdell can be forgiven, however, for not getting it quite right. At
the time that Langdell introduced the case book method, there was little
or no research on the best way to teach, let alone the best method for
helping students develop the adaptive expertise that they need as
professionals. Indeed, educational researchers do not have-and will
probably never have-all of the answers on how to best prepare a
diverse group of individuals for the practice of law. Nonetheless, law
school faculties need to demonstrate their own adaptive expertise by
reviewing the existing research and using that research to evaluate and,
when appropriate, invent new ways of teaching the law.
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